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Abstract
The international debate on the ethics and legality of autonomous weapon systems (AWS), along with the call for a ban, 
primarily focus on the nebulous concept of fully autonomous AWS. These are AWS capable of target selection and engage-
ment absent human supervision or control. This paper argues that such a conception of autonomy is divorced from both 
military planning and decision-making operations; it also ignores the design requirements that govern AWS engineering and 
the subsequent tracking and tracing of moral responsibility. To show how military operations can be coupled with design 
ethics, this paper marries two different kinds of meaningful human control (MHC) termed levels of abstraction. Under this 
two-tiered understanding of MHC, the contentious notion of ‘full’ autonomy becomes unproblematic.
Keywords Meaningful human control · Autonomous weapons · Systems theory · Design for values · Applied ethics
Introduction
Although technological innovations have always played a 
key role in military operations, autonomous weapons sys-
tems (AWS) have received asymmetric attention in public 
debate as well as academic discussions—and for good rea-
son (Kania, 2017). As these systems are designed to carry 
out more and more tasks once in the domain of human 
operators, questions regarding their autonomy and potential 
recalcitrance have sparked discussion. Debate highlights a 
potential accountability gap between their use and who, if 
anyone, can be held accountable. At the international level, 
discussions about how to exercise control over the develop-
ment and deployment of these autonomous military systems 
have been underway for over a decade. Still, there remains 
very little consensus as to what constitutes a sufficient level 
of control.
The concept of meaningful human control (MHC) has 
emerged in discourse to encompass this ideal of human 
control over autonomous systems. Various approaches have 
been taken to define a sufficiently robust notion of MHC 
that addresses technical requirements (Arkin, 2008), proper 
training for use (Article36, 2015; Asaro, 2009), designer-
user engagement (Leveringhaus, 2016), operations planning 
(Ekelhof, 2019), design requirements, and the responsibil-
ity of designers (Elands et al., 2019; Mecacci and Santoni 
de Sio 2019; Santoni de Sio and Van den Hoven 2018). 
Each of these approaches provide insight into how MHC 
over these types of systems can be understood and attained. 
Although they are generally proposed as isolated frame-
works for attaining MHC, they share some underlying pre-
cepts. Approaches that emphasize the operational planning 
and military context of use, such as that of Ekelhof (2019), 
provide a strong contextual landscape for understanding 
MHC. Other approaches, such as that of Santoni de Sio et al. 
(2018, 2019), focus on design histories, designer intentions 
and plans, or the responsibilities of designers and suprain-
dividual agents. They provide cogent arguments for design-
ing these systems with both backward- and forward-looking 
responsibility. Still, they largely focus on a single level of 
abstraction at the opportunity cost of the other.
This paper aims to employ the concepts of systems theory 
(theoretical lens) and systems engineering (applied lens) to 
understand MHC across these levels of abstraction (LoA). 
As a way of marrying these often-isolated projects of defin-
ing MHC, I propose a two-tiered approach to understanding 
MHC. First, it does not make sense to divorce discussions 
of AWS from actual and often trivial military operations; 
AWS exist within this landscape, not outside it. One must 
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therefore situate AWS within their operational context—the 
operational LoA—in order to understand them. However, 
this does not mean there are no accountability gaps in terms 
of technical (fully)AWS. The question of design remains 
important for determining the responsiveness of a system 
to the relevant moral reasons of the relevant agents, thereby 
creating the design LoA. By coupling these two LoA, we can 
account for the technical and full autonomy of certain types 
of AWS. Many of the issues associated with (fully)AWS can 
thus be rendered non-issues.
It should be noted that this paper does not advocate for 
the development of (fully)AWS. Rather, it focuses on the 
notion of control over certain types of AWS in light of how 
current military operations actually function and design 
practices contribute to control. At the very least, this paper 
highlights a potential gap that theorists and policymakers 
can address when formulating their own arguments for 
whether/how AWS are ethically problematic or for the pro-
hibition of certain types of AWS.
The paper is divided into the following sections. The 
first section briefly outlines both systems theory and sys-
tems engineering, which provide the conceptual lenses for 
understanding the coupling of operational and design LoA. 
The second section details the operational LoA, while the 
third section details the design LoA. Section four, which 
forms the bulk of this paper, discusses how both LoA are 
fundamental to a holistic understanding of MHC—and that 
the notion of full autonomy is actually unproblematic. Sec-
tion five presents some of the limits of this approach, as 
well as some directions for future research. The final section 
concludes the paper.
Systems theory and systems engineering
The term ‘systems theory’ is prima facie self-explanatory. 
Still, its spelt-out definition merits mentioning why a paper 
conceptualizing a theory of MHC and its application (i.e., 
design) warrants any discussion of more abstract ontology. 
There are multiple reasons for drawing an ontology. First, 
the primary reason for adopting systems theory as the onto-
logical framework for this investigation is that it (implicitly) 
characterizes the two levels of abstraction for understanding 
MHC discussed in the following sections. The operational 
level of control is characterized by a plurality of actors 
and networks that complicates—yet also constitutes—how 
military operations are structured, planned, and carried out. 
Likewise, the design level of control is fundamentally built 
on the notion of tracking and tracing networks of systems 
and actors in both the design histories and use of those sys-
tems. Second, systems theory is the theoretical framework 
from which systems engineering derives. As discussed 
below, systems engineering developed in the domain of 
defence. It is essentially the practical and managerial imple-
mentation of a systems thinking1 ontology.
Systems theory is broadly understood as the interdisci-
plinary study of organized and complex systems (Whitch-
urch & Constantine, 2009). A system can be conceived as 
a connected cluster of co-constitutive and co-varying parts, 
which can be synthetic and/or biological. A system is fun-
damentally constrained by spatiotemporal vectors, altered 
by its context (environment), and defined by its architecture 
and teleology. Its teleology, for instance, is expressed in the 
operation of the system itself (Adams et al., 2014). Systems 
are thus often characterized as being more than the sum of 
their constituent parts when expressing emergent behavior 
(Dudo et al., 2011; Wan, 2011) or synergy (Haken, 2013). 
For this reason, an alteration at any given node(s) of the 
system can result in alterations at other node(s), as well as 
in resulting behavior (if applicable). One of the aims of sys-
tems theory, then, is to map out behavior patterns in these 
complex systems in order to better predict future behaviors 
given environmental inputs.
The above is particularly true of systems that adapt and 
learn (i.e., machine learning) from their environmental con-
texts (Aliman, 2020; Ivanov, 1993; Wernaart, 2021). Simi-
larly, any single system can both support and constrain other 
systems to make them more or less robust. Overall, systems 
theory seeks to understand the kinetics of systems, their 
pressures and conditions, and the general methods or tools 
that can be extrapolated for use in understanding other sys-
tems at all levels of recursion (Graham et al., 1994) across a 
variety of fields (i.e., biology, chemistry, ecology, engineer-
ing and psychology). Such understanding aims to optimize 
equifinality (Beven, 2006).
Unlike approaches specific to a single system or domain, 
general systems theory (GST) intends to develop tools and 
methods for a general understanding of complex systems 
(Von Bertalanffy, 1972). GST distinguishes between system 
types in terms of activity and passivity. Active systems are 
characterized by structures or components that engage in 
processes or otherwise exhibit active behavior. Passive sys-
tems are those structures that are engaged or processed. Any 
given system can be both passive and active at any given 
spatiotemporal vector. An AWS is a passive system when 
it is powered down or lacks a power source. However, it 
becomes an active system when it is booted and deployed 
in the field. Systems can also be composed of passive and 
active systems. This framing becomes particularly relevant 
for an ontological understanding of complex AI systems 
that employ what are often considered opaque algorithmic 
1 Here, the term ‘systems thinking’ is used in the verbial sense. It 
refers to conceptualizing things in terms of systems or, more point-
edly within the axioms of systems theory.
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processes. Such processes result from hybrid machine learn-
ing and neural network systems (Boscoe, 2019; Turilli & 
Floridi, 2009; Wachter et al., 2017). Given the complex-
ity and necessity for directing optimal systems design, the 
applied domains of GST become particularly relevant—
especially the domain of systems engineering.
Systems engineering takes this multidisciplinary 
approach to understanding systems and applies it the under-
standing, design, management, and deployment of engi-
neered systems to ensure optimized equifinality over their 
lifecycles (Adams et al., 2014; Thomé, 1993). More specifi-
cally, engineered systems are designed to ensure that their 
constituent parts work synergistically so emergent behaviors 
are beneficial. Aside from this, systems engineering draws 
on many overlapping, human-centric disciplines such as risk 
analysis, organizational studies and project management 
(these disciplines parallel the operations planning approach 
in Ekelhof’s, 2019 conception of MHC). It is also informed 
by technical disciplines such as requirements engineering, 
cybernetics, software and electrical engineering, and indus-
trial engineering, among others. It thus holistically frames 
engineering processes as part of the larger system that condi-
tions the project being undertaken.
On a pragmatic level, systems engineering involves antici-
pating client needs and specific design requirements early on 
in the development cycle. When these have been accounted 
for, engineers can then move on to design synthesis and sys-
tem validation while always maintaining a holistic picture of 
the lifecycle of system development (i.e., systems thinking). 
To do this successfully, designers must consider all of the 
stakeholders potentially implicated by the system along with 
their values as pertaining to the design project. This latter 
point on stakeholders, which will be discussed in greater 
detail in the following sections, is directly in line with theo-
ries of responsible innovation—particularly value sensitive 
design (VSD). The conception of MHC detailed by Santoni 
di Sio et al. arises from and aligns with VSD, which unfolds 
at the design LoA. By a similar token, systems thinking in 
general (i.e., systems theory + systems engineering) provides 
a reasonable tool for framing common ground and the need 
to combine the two LoA for an equally holistic understand-
ing of MHC. The following section begins by outlining the 
operational LoA for MHC.
Meaningful human control: the operational 
level
Ekelhof (2019) approaches MHC by predicating it on mili-
tary operation practice that both supports and constrains 
targets in areas of operations. Her approach relates to MHC 
in that it is a function of the role of designers [as with San-
toni di Sio et al. (2018, 2019)] and of technical targeting 
procedures (as with Leveringhaus (2016)]. But Ekelhof’s 
approach differs in its level of abstraction by focusing on 
higher level of organization and operational control of the 
military as a supraindividual agent. This addresses the fact 
that the ‘autonomy’ of AWS (and of any human agent in the 
military, such as soldiers) is necessarily constrained by such 
operations. The result of these constraints is that ‘full’ auton-
omy, which is often construed in discussions on AWS, is not 
‘full’ in the sense that is often implied (e.g., self-determining 
agents). Instead, it is restricted to various operational deci-
sions and planning a priori to deployment and operations.
Ekelhof uses a case of conventional air operations to 
frame human involvement in operations through a dynamic 
targeting process. By framing the role of human agent deci-
sion-making within distributed systems, she outlines ways 
policymakers and theorists can determine how military 
planning and operations actually function. AWS can then 
be deployed within the context of use of these practices. 
Characterizing the human role in military decision-making, 
she outlines a six-part preoperational briefing package fol-




Before the mission is undertaken, the air component receives 
a briefing with information on mission execution. Such 
briefings are often highly detailed with information such 
as “target location, times, and munitions”; however, they 
are less detailed when we consider dynamic targeting in situ 
(Ekelhof, 2019, p. 345). Such information is distributed to 
various domains of operations to specialists, who then vet 
and use it in more detailed planning. The executers of the 
mission, in this case fighter pilots, are then brought in for 
briefing on the mission details. The pilots take the time to 
study the information provided while also taking care of any 
last-minute preparations for execution.
The following six components can be included in the 
briefing package:
1. Target (a military compound) description consisting of 
all available knowledge;
2. Target coordinates;
3. A collateral damage estimation (CDE) to give operators 
an estimate (not certainty) of expected collateral dam-
age (NATO 2016). In this example, the risk of collateral 
damage is low as long as predetermined mitigating tech-
niques are applied;
4. Recommendations for the quantity, type, and mix of 
lethal and nonlethal weapons needed to achieve the 
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desired effects (i.e., weaponeering solution) (USAF, 
2017). In our example, these are GPS-guided munitions;
5. The joint desired impact, which is used as a standard to 
identify aim points; and
6. A weather forecast that, in this case, describes a night 
with overcast condition (clouds cover most or all of the 
sky) and heavy rainfall (Ekelhof, 2019, p. 345).
Coupled with other information such as the rules of 




To find the target for operations, intelligence and data are 
required. Such targets are pre-programmed in the navigation 
systems of both the fighter jet and the payload. Whereas a 
dynamic target requires in situ data collection, the task here 
involves arriving at the preprogrammed “weapon’s envelop 
(i.e., the area within which the weapon is capable of effec-
tively reaching the target)”. This process is displayed on the 
operations heads-up display (Ekelhof, 2019, p. 345).
Step 2: Fix
Once the operator arrives within the weapon’s envelope, 
onboard systems aim to positively identify the target con-
firmed during operational planning. This ensures payload 
delivery complies with relevant military and legal norms 
(e.g., NATO, 2016). In this case, targets were preplanned 
and confirmed. For positive target identification, the operator 
usually does not engage in visual confirmation; instead, they 
refer to onboard systems and the validation that took place 
during operational planning to ensure lawful engagement of 
the identified target. Even in this fixed case of pre-planning, 
the human pilot does not need to attend to anything else 
during this phase other than arriving within the weapon’s 
envelope (Ekelhof, 2019, pp. 345–346).
Step 3: Track
The operator tracks the target within the weapon’s enve-
lope to ensure the continuity of positive identification. This 
also provides concurrent updates regarding the position and 
status of the target. In the case of a static target (e.g., a mili-
tary compound), tracking is relatively straightforward and 
involves simply entering the weapon’s envelope as in the fix 
phase (Ekelhof, 2019, p. 346).
Step 4: Target
During this phase, the relevant rules of engagement (RoE), 
laws of armed conflict (LoAC) and other targeting rules are 
invoked to ensure lawful targeting and deployment. These 
also address other considerations, such as issues related to 
collateral damage and risk factors that may result to one’s 
own forces. In this predetermined and validated target case, 
the legal and military experts who vetted the target permit 
the pilot to simply input relevant data into the vehicle and 
weapons payload delivery systems to ensure proper execu-
tion. Given the visually impairing weather conditions, any 
further collateral damage estimates cannot be attained. Plan-
ning at pre-mission stages validated that collateral damage 
estimates were low and were conducted according to the 
norms that govern them. The human pilot thus does not 
actively participate or intervene beyond piloting the vehicle 
into the weapon’s envelope (Ekelhof, 2019, p. 346).
Step 5: Engage
Once the operator enters the designated weapon’s envelope, 
the onboard computer suggests to the pilot the most oppor-
tune time for releasing the payload to ensure effectiveness. 
This suggestion is based on its knowledge of the capabilities 
of the equipped weapons system. Given that the payload 
system itself is GPS guided, there is no need for any other 
forms of targeting based on visual identification. Once the 
pilot authorizes the release of the weapon, the munitions 
guide themselves to the target (Ekelhof, 2019, p. 346).
Step 6: Assess
At this point, the results from the previous stage are assessed 
to determine the effects of the strike. Of course, a visual 
assessment from the pilot can be impaired by a number of 
factors (weather conditions, in this case). Similarly, visual 
assessments of collateral damage from the vantage point of 
a pilot may fail to accurately reflect the efficacy of the strike 
and its consequences. In the case of aerial engagements such 
as this, ground support forces may be required for a more 
accurate assessment of engagement (Ekelhof, 2019, p. 346).
In considering MHC then, it appears that most (if not 
all) of the performance latent to each step is beyond the 
pilot’s control. It could be argued that this is emblematic of 
contemporary aerial operations more generally. While the 
pilot can be seen as in direct operational control of some of 
the operation, piloting the craft to the weapon’s envelope 
and engaging in weapons release, this type of control is not 
sufficiently meaningful. This is because the pilot lacks full 
“cognitive clarity and awareness” of the situation within 
which they are participating (Article36, 2015). The privation 
begs the underlying question of whether the pilot actually 
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possesses levels of clarity and awareness sufficient enough 
to be deemed substantial in a meaningful way.
Discussions at the pilot level could provide some future 
insight both for operations employing AWS as well as mod-
ern aerial crafts. But these would converge on the operator, 
which is the wrong vector. Alternatively, such discussions 
should emphasize how the military as a supraindividual 
agent (i.e., an organization) can have MHC over target-
ing operations. Because of this, the ongoing international 
debate on AWS focuses overly much on the deployment 
stage of AWS and their relations to individual operators. In 
doing so, the debate attempts to locate the vector for MHC 
between those two agents (AWS-human). But it ignore the 
broader covariance of the distribution of labour between 
agents within a military complex that determines decision-
making practices. The steps outlined above, particularly the 
pre-mission briefing stage with its collateral damage and 
proportionality assessments, are largely sidelined in these 
discussions.
This approach shows the need for a distributed notion 
of MHC to accurately account for numerous decision and 
measures undertaken by different agents in the broader 
decision-making mechanism before deployment. Different 
agents have different levels of control over any given vec-
tor in the process. Any sufficient conception of MHC must 
therefore reflect this. Of course, this does not negate the 
role that human operators play. Rather, it positions the role 
within the larger distributed network of decision-making. 
Here, ‘full autonomy’ is not full in the sense that is com-
monly intuited. It is constrained by the larger apparatus 
within which it forms a part.2
Meaningful human control: design level3
The second level of abstraction is drawn from the account 
for MHC by Santoni di Sio et al. (see Mecacci and Santoni 
de Sio 2019; Santoni di Sio and van den Hoven 2018). Their 
view strays from existing approaches to describing MHC to 
provide a philosophical account of MHC. For them, MHC 
is the co-variance between the behavior of a system and 
the intentions or reasons behind an agent’s decisions and 
actions. Systems can be designed in ways that permit agents 
to forfeit some of their direct operational control while still 
possessing global control over the system itself. This means 
that more, rather than less, levels of autonomy may (in 
certain cases) permit more salient control of a system. As 
mentioned in the preceding section, more direct operational 
control has little meaning in the desired sense for autono-
mous systems. In their approach, clearer lines of account-
ability can be drawn when humans remain ‘in-the-loop’ over 
a system. As tracking the relevant reasons behind an agent’s 
decisions is a necessary condition for MHC, the retention of 
humans ‘in-the-loop’ allows MHC.
Their approach to MHC is functionally comprehensive 
in its breadth, which looks beyond individual systems to 
the whole sociotechnical infrastructure wherein systems are 
embedded. Although the specific design and deployment of 
systems implicate important factors in understanding MHC, 
they cannot be understood in isolation from the infrastruc-
tures, organizations, and other agents who are inextricably 
connected to their design, deployment and use (Umbrello, 
2020). The approach focuses on the design level because 
it describes MHC as something that can be designed for 
by engineers. In other words, MHC are technical design 
requirements—not only for the system itself, but also for 
relevant sociotechnical infrastructures. In order to design for 
MHC, two necessary conditions must be met: tracking and 
tracing. Satisfaction of these two conditions permits a more 
comprehensive conception of MHC that reaches beyond 
that of solely end users. Here, a level of meaningful control 
is extended to agents such as designers and policymakers 
along with organizations and states. With this control comes 
clearer lines for attributing responsibility.
Tracking and tracing conditions
The tracking condition deals with how responsive a system 
is to the actions consequent of human reasons.4 It is more 
comprehensively defined as:
First necessary condition of meaningful human con-
trol. In order to be under meaningful human control, 
a decision-making system should demonstrably and 
verifiably be responsive to the human moral reasons 
relevant in the circumstances - no matter how many 
system levels, models, software, or devices of what-
ever nature separate a human being from the ultimate 
effects in the world, some of which may be lethal. 
That is, decision-making systems should track (rel-
evant) human moral reasons. (Santoni de Sio & van 
den Hoven, 2018, p. 7)
2 This echoes (and Ekelhof repeats it as well) the Defence Science 
Board’s statement that “there are no fully autonomous systems just as 
there are no fully autonomous soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines” 
(USSB, 2012, p. 23).
3 Much of description in this section is adapted from a paper I pub-
lished previously, which offers a similar recounting of Santoni di Sio 
et al.’s version of MHC (Umbrello 2020).
4 Here, the term ‘reasons’ is understood as any element that can both 




The tracing condition is different given that it asks 
whether it is possible to delimit the human agent(s) along 
the design and deployment history of the system. This means 
designers, manufacturers, users, and others who are capable 
of: (1) understanding the system’s potential; and (2) rec-
ognizing their moral responsibility for the deployment and 
use of a system (i.e., the liability of moral consequence). 
Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven (2018) define tracing 
more thoroughly as:
Second necessary condition of meaningful human 
control: in order for a system to be under meaning-
ful human control, its actions/states should be trace-
able to a proper moral understanding on the part of 
one or more relevant human persons who design or 
interact with the system, meaning that there is at least 
one human agent in the design history or use context 
involved in designing, programming, operating and 
deploying the autonomous system who (a) understands 
or is in the position to understand the capabilities of 
the system and the possible effects in the world of the 
its use; (b) understands or is in the position to under-
stand that others may have legitimate moral reactions 
toward them because of how the system affects the 
world and the role they occupy. (p. 9)
MHC is attained by agents who can satisfy both of these 
conditions; only then can they be said to have MHC over 
a system. This means AWS can prima facie fall under the 
MHC of (an) agent(s) when they are designed to support 
the values of accessibility and explicability (explainability 
and transparency), which manifest in system behavior, as 
much as possible. If a system is able to explain its inter-
nal decision-making (explicability) and if such systems 
are themselves transparent (also a factor of explicability), 
then they can be brought under MHC more easily at least in 
theory. This is because agent understanding of the use and 
deployment of a system can be more easily attributed to the 
design architecture of the system.
With these two necessary conditions, this approach to 
MHC ultimately entails a definition of control that is more 
nuanced and stringent than operational control. The latter 
demands full, direct control. But control over design is more 
stringent than direct operational control because it precludes 
the attribution of human control to systems just because they 
have an agent ‘in-the-loop’ (e.g., a soldier co-commanding 
a field operation with an AWS). Even if a commander has 
a kill switch or can visibly see the current status and activi-
ties of an AWS, this does not necessarily mean they are 
equipped to understand why the system does what it does. 
In such cases, MHC by the end user is unattainable because 
the tracing condition cannot be fulfilled due to the opacity 
of the system. Other agents, such as designers, program-
mers, the military institution, or even the state. may very 
well understand what is going on in the ‘black box’ of the 
AWS. The system could successfully track the reasons of 
those agents. Those agents may indeed be capable of under-
standing the behavior exhibited by the system. Based on the 
tracking of their primary and more proximal reasons, they 
could then be held responsible for the behavior exhibited by 
the system the system along with the way it acts. In the end, 
these agents have MHC over the AWS. It is here that we 
can begin to see how the design level can help navigate the 
distributed nature of military operations planning that was 
discussed regarding the operational level of MHC.
The Santoni de Sio et alia account for MHC, which is far 
more nuanced than presented here, delves into various types 
of reasons (e.g. proximal and distal ones) (Mecacci & de 
Sio, 2019). This paper aims to take a more meta-normative 
approach of combining these theories into a unified notion of 
MHC. The following section begins this project by discuss-
ing how the two LoA are complementary. Both are under-
scored by a systems thinking perspective and both can be 
optimized via a systems engineering approach to operational 
and design innovation.
MHC as design thinking and design 
engineering as MHC
Technical full autonomy and AWS
As mentioned in the introduction, the central premise of 
a possible ban on AWS is grounded in a certain level of 
autonomy that results in an accountability gap in the event 
of recalcitrance. Sharkey (2014) aptly describes five levels of 
technical autonomy that can describe AWS targeting (Fig. 1). 
The least problematic stage is level 1 (although Ekelhof’s 
analysis arguably brings into question which human). Levels 
4 and 5 are arguably the most problematic. Both are seen as 
dangerous due to how an AWS selects a target (i.e., systemic 
opacity, computer vision, etc.) and its technical ability to 
1
• Human engages with and selects a target and initiates any 
attack 
2
• Program suggests alternative targets and human chooses 
which to attack 
3
• Program selects target and human must approve before attack
4 
• Program selects target and human has restricted time to veto
5
• Program selects target and initiates attack without human 
involvement
Fig. 1  Level of Autonomy. Source: (Sharkey, 2014)
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do so as a function of various targeting norms and the rules 
of engagement. Level 4 questions the cognitive clarity of a 
human operator who has veto power when determining the 
validity of the target(s) chosen by the system. Regardless, 
Level 5 is typically the subject of debate as it is considered 
the descriptor of full autonomy in terms of AWS.
Here, we can already begin to tease out some of the issue 
with problematizing autonomy per se. There are convincing 
arguments contra AWS other than the supposed account-
ability gap proposed by the above ordinance, such as the 
dehumanization of war and its deleterious effects on human 
dignity. But it appears that actual military operations plan-
ning and deployment intuitively constrains the autonomy 
of any given agent, soldier, or AWS to being a function of 
a larger a priori plan. This plan bears little, if any, intrinsic 
operational value outside their functional capacity to carry 
out such plans. Of course, this does not extricate the AWS 
deployed within such constraints from the possibilities of 
limitless actions or wanton recalcitrance. As a predicate for 
technical design requirements, technical design must reflect 
both the proximal and distal intentions and goals of relevant 
agents within the deployment envelope. These would be 
the commanders who employ such weapons in their area of 
operations as well as potential human operators who may 
be engaging with them symbiotically on the ground (e.g., 
aerial AWS such as fully autonomous drones). Regardless, 
the system capacity to respond to the relevant moral reasons 
of relevant agents must be considered a foundational vari-
able in the weaponeering decision-making process for any 
given context of deployment in the pre-mission stages.
Coupling levels of abstraction for MHC
Systems theory (and in practice, systems thinking) provides 
salient ground for thinking about these various LoA. The 
procedural process of operational planning and target iden-
tification form the higher, or meta-, level of MHC as clearer 
lines of causality can be conceptualized. This culminates 
in weapons release and efficacy assessments. Similarly, the 
design level of MHC is functionally dependent on a sys-
tems understanding of both tracing design histories as well 
as tracking the responsiveness of autonomous systems to 
the relevant moral reason(s) of the relevant agent(s) in the 
design and use chains for such systems. Theoretically speak-
ing, both LoA are predicated on systems or networks of 
interconnected nodes (Fig. 2). Similarly, both LoA feed into 
one another despite their different scopes. Within the opera-
tional level, the bounds in which weaponeering decisions are 
made prior to deployment are contingent on the functionality 
of the system itself in order for it to be chosen as the most 
salient means for carrying out the intended mission. But how 
such technical responsiveness to the on-the-ground needs for 
successful mission completion is not contingent on those 
types of pre-mission assessments. System-level recalcitrance 
can jeopardize the overall level of MHC even when the sys-
tem is bound by the operational level of control.
Weaponeering decisions must thus be reflected at the 
design level in order for those decisions to be sufficiently 
salient prior to deployment. In this sense, the operational 
level feeds down into the design level by supplying the 
norms, objectives, and intentions necessary for deployment 
to be lawful. These are also necessary for the operational 
level to be holistic in terms of the sufficiency of control. 
Likewise, the various agents that are essential to pre-mission 
planning operations form part of the population of relevant 
moral agents (or collectively as a supraindividual agent); 
these agents permit the design level to actually design AWS 
so they are sufficiently responsive to the reasons and inten-
tions of the actor(s) who makes the weaponeering of AWS 
permissible—and thus under a priori MHC on both LoA. Of 
course, this would mean a closer military-industrial partner-
ship that uses these agents as stakeholders for whom systems 
can be designed (coupled with the relevant RoE and LoAC).
One scenario that is often discussed in the literature con-
tra AWS is that of an AWS killing civilians. Within this 
scenario, we can begin to trace reasons for dismissing such 
a prima facie objection. In order for an AWS to kill a civil-
ian on the ground, the civilian must fall within the weapons 
envelope delimited prior to deployment. The killing is not 
Fig. 2  The superordinance of Systems Theory and Engineering over 
the two levels of abstraction of MHC
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mala in se to the extent that collateral damage assessments 
are agreed upon pre-deployment under existing norms for 
proportionality. To some degree, the killing of civilians is 
not necessarily equivocal to recalcitrance as it can be traced 
back to the briefing information. If we imagine that an AWS 
kills civilians disproportionately even within the weapons 
envelope and even against explicitly acceptable damages 
determined in pre-planning, this can be construed as tech-
nical recalcitrance. This is because it can be traced back to 
the relevant agents within the design and use histories of the 
AWS to determine whether the system was designed in such 
a way as to be maximally responsive to the relevant inten-
tions of those agents.
If such is shown to not be the case, then the AWS was 
under MHC. It is thus not a viable option for weaponeering 
decisions and its deployment was unlawful overall (this is 
a good vector for thinking about ban criteria). If relevant 
agents such as designers and users (commanders, AWS 
designers/programmers, proportionality specialists, etc.) are 
capable of understanding the capabilities and consequences 
of the system, then they may be said to be in possession of 
MHC. They have MHC both in their weaponeering decisions 
on the operational level, as well as in design decisions at the 
design level. Divorcing one level from the other leaves open 
vectors from which accountability gaps can arise.
Systems engineering can be understood as the design and 
application of both of these levels of MHC. It seems (and 
perhaps is) more appropriate to speak of systems engineer-
ing in terms of the design level, given its explicit focus on 
building autonomous systems responsibly in a holistic and 
anticipatory way—particularly in alignment with the values 
of stakeholders. But the operational level is necessary for 
that reason. As mentioned above, all of the agents within the 
complex network distributed across the process of military 
target acquisition and deployment are relevant moral ones. 
They are all part of the larger system within which the AWS 
exists. Likewise, the AWS themselves are embedded in the 
larger sociotechnical network of operations involving those 
human agents. In order for these human agents to make sali-
ent and hopefully lawful decisions in terms of weaponeering, 
whether early on or throughout the development cycle, their 
needs must be analyzed and elicited. This step is critical. 
At the same time, the entirety of the lifecycle of the system 
as relates explicitly to those weaponeering decisions must 
be kept in mind. The system is not a discrete technological 
artifact divorced from its use-context. To put it more simply, 
AWS should not be built and marketed as a discrete and 
novel weapons platform. Designers and experts who plan 
operations must be part of the design teams to weaponeer 
the design decisions themselves.
Many of the technical issues presented as mala in se 
against the development of AWS, such as increased auton-
omy (particularly level 5 as in Fig. 1) or the targeting of 
civilians, are only problematic if decoupled from responsible 
design, actual military planning, and actual operations prac-
tices. When these are taken into account, the augmentation 
of autonomy is necessarily constrained by many—if not all 
º of these processes. In certain cases, autonomy can increase 
rather than decrease the ability to have MHC. If these sys-
tems are designed so as to be maximally sensitive to the 
relevant moral reasons of the relevant moral agent(s), then 
they likewise augment MHC rather than lessen it. Mecacci 
and Santoni de Sio (2019) demonstrate this seemingly par-
adoxical paradigm nicely with autonomous vehicles. The 
marriage of both LoA, then, is teleological towards systemic 
synergism. In avoiding component friction, it subsequently 
avoids the unreliability of the design and deployment of 
AWS.
For systems engineering practices to successfully opti-
mize equifinality across various levels of nesting, complex-
ity has to be modeled as a function—one of not only the 
technical architecture of a system, but also the logical human 
organization of data (i.e., planning, target data, proportion-
ality assessments, geography, etc.). Given the volume and 
quality of the data, variables, and components across techni-
cal and human spheres, systems may become increasingly 
complex over time. Much of this can be addressed through 
the design and development of smarter control algorithms 
and environmental systems analyses. Tools such as system 
architecture modeling, verification and learning simulations, 
and statistical or reliability analyses along with formal deci-
sion-making psychology can all be levied to understand the 
covariance between technical design and human operations.
Divorcing the operational level from design leaves design 
impotent and potentially recalcitrant. Divorcing the design 
level from operations leaves operations with an opaque and 
nebulous lethal tool that may result in poor (if not unlaw-
ful) weaponeering decisions. We can think about systems 
and, more specifically, these various levels of abstraction 
as co-constituting one another. This permits their inherent 
complexity to be modeled more easily. As a consequence, 
we can design for complexity rather than leaving design 
decisions ad hoc afterthoughts. Doing this allows for the 
tracing of clearer lines of emergent behaviors and bounda-
ries—provided that systems thinking is employed at all lev-
els of nesting.
Limitations and areas for future research
There is at least one notable limitation on this multi-tiered 
approach: dynamic engagements of AWS in situ rather 
than purely pre-programmed engagements pose greater 
challenges. This is particularly true of ground-based AWS 
in comparison to aerial ones. Ground-based AWS can find 
themselves (and perhaps most often will) in dynamic and 
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changing engagement scenarios even within the weapon’s 
envelope. Their ability to adhere to the pre-determined 
mission and targets while also adapting to changing sce-
narios gives rise to both technical and ethical issues. 
Given the decisions and identification that emerges from 
dynamic war theatres and their proximity (and thus finer 
grained situational input) to targets, such type of ground-
based systems appear to take on more moral agency. In 
these cases, the operational level may be insufficient for 
grounding MHC in such cases. Still, the design level can 
provide possible ways to ensure sufficient control.
Systems can be designed to be maximally responsive 
to the largest set of moral reasons and intentions of the 
relevant agents (in this case, perhaps the commanding 
officer on the ground alongside the AWS and/or the 
commander supervising the mission/engagement). The 
recalcitrance of such systems can then be tracked and 
traced back to these individuals, along with the designers 
who engineered the autonomous systems. Elands et al. 
(2019) provide one model route for the design level in 
conceptualizing exactly how more in situ operations can 
take place and remain under MHC. Likewise, there are 
developments on advanced intelligent systems (e.g., in 
the domain of cyber physical systems, Artificial General 
Intelligence, and AI safety) that explore how systems 
can be (technically) self-aware, have hybrid AI, and be 
oriented towards a well-specified objective, utility func-
tion, or goal formulated by humans (Aliman, 2020). An 
important consequence of this research is that the objec-
tive, utility, or value function is not part of the design of 
the system [orthogonality between goal and intelligence] 
(Aliman, 2020).
Either way, this limitation shows a further nuance that 
resists arguments for a blanket ban on (fully)AWS: the 
difference between aerial (fully)AWS and ground-based 
(fully)AWS. The operational level seems to tokenize the 
agent who is in direct operational control of the engage-
ment, stripping them of most (if not all) relevant levels 
of autonomy necessary for moral responsibility. For this 
reason, the substitution of such human agents in aerial 
engagements appears benign. For a ban on (fully)AWS to 
be effective, then, it seems that targeting autonomy per 
se is not the right strategy. Instead, a more effective route 
would involve targeting various specific types of AWS 
and differentiating them (i.e., ground, aerial, naval AWS). 
Of course, this risks over-specification and leaves open 
the possibility of circumventing very specific designa-
tions and criteria for banned systems. However, it should 
not discount the above criticism. Rather, it should rather 
wrestle with it head on in order to ensure more robust 
policy-making.
Conclusions
This paper uses systems thinking and systems engineering 
as conceptual tools to frame the commonalities between 
two different levels of abstraction in understanding the 
meaningful human control of autonomous weapons sys-
tems. It argues that with AWS in particular, both LoA 
are necessary to achieve MHC. If this coupling is suc-
cessful, the result would be increased levels of autonomy. 
Increased autonomy is often seen as problematic, lying at 
the core of the rationale for a ban on those types of AWS. 
But this perception is flawed and perhaps entirely dismissi-
ble. Autonomy per se, whether of humans or the AWS, is 
necessarily constrained by military operations planning 
and the co-construction of these systems with their rel-
evant moral stakeholders. As long as the strict conditions 
are met across LoA, then increasing the autonomy of AWS 
to what is traditionally called ‘full’ autonomy is not prob-
lematic. Such an increase in autonomy can conceivably 
increase MHC as well.
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